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Abstract 
There continue to be numerous breaches publicised pertaining to cyber 
security despite security practices being applied within industry for many 
years.  This article is intended to be the first in a number of articles as 
research into cyber security assurance processes.   This article is compiled 
based on current research related to cyber security assurance and the 
impact of the human element on it.  The objective of this work is to 
identify elements of cyber security that would benefit from further 
research and development based on the literature review findings.  The 
results outlined in this article present a need for the cyber security field to 
look in to established industry areas to benefit from effective practices 
such as human reliability assessment, along with improved methods of 
validation such as statistical quality control in order to obtain true 
assurance.  The article proposes the development of a framework that will 
be based upon defined and repeatable quantification, specifically relating 
to the range of human aspect tasks that provide, or are intended not to 
negatively affect cyber security posture.    
1. Introduction  
 
Information security management has grown significantly over the last 25 years 
and is now a common and regular item within the public domain.  With buzz 
words such as hacking and cyber security being included within headlines and 
being a common topic of conversation amongst everyday technology users, 
information security is at the forefront of people’s minds.  The National Initiative 
for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies [1] defines cyber security within its glossary 
as ‘The activity or process, ability or capability or state whereby information and 
communications systems and the information contained therein are protected from 
and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation.   
These security-related terms have changed over the years as information security 
community leaders pushed the terms information security management through to 
information assurance (IA) up the agenda and eventually bursting into the public 
domain, including under its current guise of cyber security specifically addressing 
electronic aspects. However, the objectives have always been the same which is to 
primarily protect information which we process and are responsible for.  Also, 
equally importantly there appears to be a lack of understanding within the security 
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2 
community as to what cyber security actually is.  For example, Health Information 
Trust Alliance [2] states that ‘cybersecurity does not address non-malicious human 
threat actors, such as a well-meaning but misguided employee’.  Based on this 
observation this article focusses on the human factor of cyber security assurance. 
However, despite the huge surge in interest and acceptance of information security 
management, incorporating cyber security, there still appear to be gaps and 
weaknesses within industry and practice.  This is evident due to the large numbers 
of significant security incidents and data breaches that are being publicised on a 
regular basis including recent incidents affecting Carphone Warehouse in August 
2015, TalkTalk in October 2015, Vtech in November 2015 and inadvertent email 
disclosure by the Bank of England in May 2015.  
 
As a result of the continuing publication of high-profile security breaches, 
organisations are increasing focus [3] and looking for ways to improve their 
assurance in order to protect their brand and reputation, as well as to prevent or 
reduce the associated financial impacts [4].  This generates a picture of the 
inadequacy of current assurance methods for both industry and society.  Assurance 
techniques and approaches, in addition to technology, are required which will 
protect organisations and the public as a whole from continuing costly cyber 
security breaches.  There exist technology related breaches occurring due to 
malicious individuals exploiting vulnerabilities in technology on a regular basis 
and these are expected to continue [5] as these security hacks are now quick to 
appear in the media due to general public interest.  Interestingly, and perhaps 
surprisingly to those outside the security community, 50% of the worst breaches in 
the last year were caused by inadvertent human error, rising from 31% the previous 
year [5].  Therefore, half of significant security incidents that are occurring are due 
to a particular element which has not changed since the inception of information 
security management.  That element is people and the unintentional mistakes and 
errors that they make.   
 
1.1. Motivation 
 
The motivation for this article is to take a holistic look at the current status of cyber 
security based upon published research and recognised survey results in order to 
identify areas of weakness, and propose areas of further research which would 
advance the field of cyber security and therefore benefit wider society.  This article 
intends to look outside of the current practices within cyber security and identify 
information and research from specialised fields and industry sectors that are 
established and proved to be effective that could be potentially applied and 
assessed to understand whether positive improvements could be realised.    
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3 
1.2. Contributions 
 
This article makes the following contributions: 
1. It reviews current materials relating to cyber security breaches, assurance 
research and mechanisms and publishes findings  
2. Looks into the significance of the human element on cyber security 
assurance  
3. Proposes further research using non-standard cyber security assurance 
mechanisms that are currently applied within other fields and highlight 
possible implications such as resourcing overhead. 
The article from this point forward will be structured as follows.  The article will 
look in to publicised cyber security data breaches and then move on to defining 
assurance and subsequently identifying current assurance methods and standards 
currently adopted by organisations.  The document will then progress on to human 
factor statistics pertaining to cyber security assurance and related human behaviour 
that underpins these statistics.  The article then moves on to mechanisms for 
measurement and assessment used outside of the cyber security field that could 
benefit the current state of cyber security based on the negative aspects earlier 
captured within the article.    
    
2. Publicised cyber security data breaches 
 
There have been significant volumes of serious healthcare related data breaches [6] 
despite the introduction of the Information Governance Toolkit (IGT) with 7255 
NHS data breaches between 2011 and 2014 [7] and showing a trend of volume 
increases whereby there was a 101% increase from 2013 to 2014 [8].  Outside of 
the UK the trend continues with unintentional exposure of private or sensitive 
information being 83% higher for healthcare organisations than other industries but 
the lowest performing industry in incident response [9]. Dunn [8] also reported that 
93% of breaches were due to human error and 95% of data loss in the UK is due to 
the cultural factors of people [10]. 
The UK Government 2015 security breaches survey [5] found that there had been 
an increase in the number of security breaches from 81% of large organisations to 
90% indicating why security breaches are perceived to continue and be an expected 
element of business now and in the future that cannot be completely eradicated.  
The survey also identified that nearly 9 out of 10 large organisations surveyed now 
suffer some form of security breach suggesting that these incidents are now a near 
certainty. The report also stated that businesses should ensure they are managing 
the risk accordingly, and despite the increase in staff awareness training, people are 
as likely to cause a breach as viruses and other types of malicious software.  
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4 
Interestingly the survey found that levels of security awareness delivered had gone 
up compared to the previous year even though staff related breaches had also risen.  
The survey showed that 72% of large organisations now deliver ongoing security 
awareness training to their staff compared with 68% the previous year.  This 
highlights that simply pushing out standard security awareness information to the 
employees of an organisation is not an effective means of cyber security assurance 
in relation to human behaviour.  
 
3. Assurance Definition 
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology [11], assurance is 
defined as being ‘Grounds for confidence that the other four security goals 
(integrity, availability, confidentiality, and accountability) have been adequately 
met by a specific implementation.  Therefore, having that in mind, it is difficult for 
responsible people residing at the top of the organisational hierarchy such as Chief 
Executive Officers, Boards, Managing Directors, Owners and Senior Managers to 
have confidence or guarantee that the information that their respective organisation 
is responsible for processing is adequately secured.  This issue has been 
compounded by the change of terminology used over the years including utilisation 
of the term assurance incorrectly where it is actually referring to the underpinning 
controls or countermeasures being applied.   
CESG [12] identified four elements of assurance within an assurance model.  
These four elements were intrinsic assurance, extrinsic assurance, implementation 
assurance and operational assurance.  Based on the published cyber security 
incidents and breaches in the areas of operational assurance and extrinsic assurance 
within the field of cyber security this article will focus on those areas.  CESG [12] 
defines operational assurance as the activities necessary to maintain the product, 
system or service’s security functionality once it has entered operational use.  
Extrinsic assurance is also defined as any activity independent of the development 
environment which provides a level of trust in the product, system or service.  
3.1. Assurance Methods  
There seems to be a current position within common standards whereby security 
assurance programmes need to be flexible [13] and require the organisation to 
determine what needs to be monitored and the method of monitoring as stated 
within clauses 9.1a and 9.1b by the British Standards Institution [14].  Standard 
assurance activities have been static for some time and not evolved at the pace of 
technology and cyber security.  It is essential to have an agile security assurance 
framework in place to meet the needs of differing organisations and bodies.  
However, the current frameworks are very broad and despite being in existence for 
some time does not appear to be fully addressing cyber security specific assurance 
requirements as the breaches and statistics outlined in this article have shown.  
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5 
According to PWC [5] the most common form of cyber risk assurance is 
information / cyber security risk assessment with 64% of organisations adopting 
this method.  This position entirely relies upon the level of experience available to 
the organisation to interpret requirements, quantify findings effectively, develop 
and source assurance methods and tools, and finally communicate the cyber 
security status.  This lack of consistency and clarity means that very few 
applications of cyber security assurance are the same and therefore the industry 
could benefit from a more prescriptive hierarchy of standards.  These standards 
should offer greater practical guidance to organisations and providing clear 
quantification mechanisms for vulnerabilities associated with the human aspects of 
cyber security as are currently in place for technical vulnerabilities using the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).  This survey response shows that 
methods of assurance in relation to cyber security have not changed in order to 
match the current climate.  Despite schemes being developed to provide assurance 
for Internet-facing technology such as the CESG Cyber Essentials Scheme [15] 
there is no wider assurance equivalent and also no published methodology 
addressing the assurance required relating to the human factors of cyber security.  
This includes clear quantification, enabling levels of cyber security effectiveness to 
be applied and acted upon in a consistent manner.   These factors are very 
important as human interaction is still an essential element of cyber security 
despite the ever-changing technologies being made available to support assurance 
goals.  These human activities include routine processing of electronic confidential 
or sensitive data through to the regular implementation and configuration of 
technical changes by computer system support personnel.  This is a diverse range 
of cyber security-related activity that are essential but in isolation to not enable 
oversight and assurance. 
Based on published scientific papers and technical reports there appears to be a 
heavy focus on implementing the underpinning security controls which, although 
essential, does not include the confirmation that that these controls have been 
applied correctly or as intended in order to attain assurance.  This again makes the 
point that greater emphasis needs to be applied to assurance activities rather than 
just application of controls.  An example of this is the McCumber cube [16] which 
has been, and continues to be, heavily utilised and enhanced within information 
security practices.   
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Figure 1. Conceptual model indicating assurance requirements encompassing the 
McCumber Cube  
 
3.2. Common standards 
There are a number of mechanisms in existence and operation currently which 
support cyber security assurance [17].  These include risk assessment, risk 
treatment, risk management, security testing and auditing.  Despite these numerous 
mechanisms, news of high-profile security breaches are occurring and being 
publicised on a continuing frequent basis [18] and the impact of these breaches in 
financial terms doubled from 2013 to 2014 [19]. 
Research has shown that ISO/IEC 27001 remains the leading general standard for 
security management [5] and from a health perspective the key security standards 
underpinning the NHS Information Governance Toolkit are ISO/IEC 27001/2 [20].  
Also, interestingly, the main drivers for securing sensitive data was compliance 
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7 
with standards [9] rather than a primary desire to protect the data for the right 
ethical reasons.  Research identified that 51 of the 63 Information Security 
Assurance requirements within the UK Health and Social Care Information Centre 
(HSCIC) Information Governance Toolkit originated from the ISO27000 series of 
standards including ISO/IEC 27001 :2013, ISO 27002:2013, 27005:2009 and 
associated applicable controls.   The other most prominent requirement origins 
included the Data Protection Act 1998, Caldicott Report and Principles, and the 
NHS Information Security Code of Practice.  
Cherdantseva and Hilton [21] state ‘an attempt to cover the entire knowledge area 
forces decisions to be taken that may launch a polemic’. This suggests that the 
current broad standards based on the principles of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability are too broad and therefore not effective specifically in relation to 
cyber security which is a view supported by the number of publicised cyber 
security data breaches.  Originally the ISO/IEC 27001 standard, initially known as 
BS 7799-2, was utilised to address business continuity planning and disaster 
recovery testing due to the fact that no accepted standard covering this area was 
available.  Now with ISO 22301, Business Continuity Management, being utilised 
this has allowed security professions to quite rightly focus on the security aspects 
of these areas rather than them both in entirety falling within the availability 
principle.  With other overlapping standards that can be certified against such as 
ISO/IEC 20000-1:2011, Information Technology – Service Management, covering 
security management aspects such as change management, release management, 
asset management and also BS 10012, Personal Information Management, used to 
develop a personal information management system in accordance with Data 
Protection legislation.  Given the current statistics captured within this article 
therefore  there is a need to develop a framework and hierarchy that allows 
whereby formal certification and assurance in relation to cyber security should be 
both re-scoped and also made more stringent in order to provide effective 
assurance.  This would also include specific assurance for the human aspect of 
cyber security assurance.  
 
4. Current cyber security human factor statistics 
There have been a number of studies and surveys undertaken relating to varying 
aspects of cyber security; the SANS Healthcare Cyber Security Survey [9], The 
Insider Threat Spotlight Report 2015 [22], Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills, 2014 Information Security Breaches Survey [19], and the PWC US 
Cybercrime survey [23] to name but a few. The Insider Threat Spotlight Report 
2015 [22] stated that companies were more concerned by inadvertent insider threat 
data leak breaches than malicious data breaches.  However, there is no evidence of 
this level of concern in industry and the cyber security community in terms of 
change of practice.  According to the SANS Healthcare Cyber Security Survey [9], 
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8 
51% considered the negligent insider as the chief threat.  Yet within the ‘Looking 
Forward’ section of the document there was no mention of human security testing 
and in fact [23] states that only 28% of organisations are conducting employee 
monitoring.   
The very informative PWC 2015 Information Security Breaches Survey [5] 
highlighted significant statistics and information pertaining to staff-related 
breaches which featured notably in the survey. Key findings included that three-
quarters of large organisations suffered a staff-related breach and nearly one-third 
of small organisations had a similar occurrence, which had risen up from 58% for 
large organisations and 22% for small organisations compared to the previous year.  
These statistics show the difficulty of applying cyber security controls concerning 
human behaviour and interaction with confidential and sensitive information.  
Within larger organisations there are more processes to assure and a smaller 
number of information security personnel per employee.  To support this finding it 
was also found within the survey that 72% of companies where the security policy 
was poorly understood had staff related breaches, which again could be down to 
the low ratio of information security personnel to employees to be able to clearly 
communicate the policy to all staff. The PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, US 
cybercrime: Rising risks, reduced readiness key findings from the 2014 US State of 
Cybercrime Survey [23] found that for healthcare, the number of respondents who 
reported unintentional exposure of private or sensitive information was 83% higher 
than overall respondents and a critical shortcoming for a highly regulated industry 
that deals in sensitive personal information. 
The continued evolution of technology is hugely beneficial globally and in all 
areas of life.  However, these advances in technology, including a focus on ease of 
use and communication have brought with them significant changes to the cyber 
security landscape including broader opportunities for people within organisations 
at all levels access to information and also made it easier to collate, remove and 
circulate vast volumes of sensitive data [24] at the touch of a button with very little 
organisational diligence and assurance. Research found that 92% of organisations 
allowed access to calendar and email via mobile devices.  However, 52% also 
allow respondents to access health records information from mobile devices [9].  It 
was also publicised that 15% of large organisations had a security or data breach in 
the last year involving smartphones or tablets which is up from 7% the previous 
year [5]. 
Whilst the internet and email has revolutionised how people communicate in the 
workplace, the rise of technology designed to improve collaboration, productivity 
and innovation has been matched by a rise of employee-related breaches affecting 
organisations.  It was stated that communications and collaboration applications 
are most vulnerable to insider attack and that the perceived increase in insider 
attacks is due to 3 areas: awareness/training, data on mobile devices, and lack of 
data protection strategy or solution [22].  The PWC Information Security Breaches 
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9 
Survey [5] also reported that people are the main vulnerabilities to a secure 
enterprise. The survey respondents believe that inadvertent human error (48%), 
lack of staff awareness (33%) and weaknesses in vetting individuals (17%), were 
all contributing factors in causing the single worst breach that organisations 
suffered. Regardless of the motivation of an insider, be it a deliberate act of theft or 
designed to embarrass an organisation; or if the breach was inadvertent due to a 
lack of internal controls, the threat from ‘insiders’ has not diminished across the 
UK [5]. 
Delving a little deeper into the statistics reveals that inadvertent human error 
caused half of the single worst security breaches for all respondents in 2015. This 
was a marked increase of over 60% year on year, and continues the trend since 
2013 where accidental or inadvertent action by individuals was the main cause for 
the single worst breach [5].   The cyber security incidents that typically fly under 
the media radar are insider events. It was found that 28% of respondents pointed 
the finger at insiders, which includes trusted parties such as current and former 
employees, service providers, and contractors [23]. 
Although there is evidence of empirical studies that have taken place, research 
found that only few have been performed in terms of IT governance [25] but also 
further research is required relating to human behaviour and the relationship 
between social influence and behavioural intent [26].  Shahri, Ismail and Rahim 
[10] also highlighted that improving security within the healthcare organisation by 
adequate education and training can increase the basic knowledge and judgement 
of users about information security; and it can help to prevent the human errors and 
carelessness, but little empirical evidence supported these claims.   
 
5. Human Behaviour  
 
Research suggests that human behaviour is not consistent and can be strongly 
influenced by relationships, there is also a general naïve belief that bad things only 
happen to other people [26].  Research also found that people were willing to 
undertake risky practices.  Individuals were actually rewarded as they were seen as 
helpful for allowing an event to take place without applying security controls or 
practice [27]. 
During the literature review research into other aspects of assurance and human 
behaviour were also investigated.  These included the use of fear appeals and also 
user perceptions of risky behaviour pertaining to computer security.  Fear appeals 
are persuasive communications that include an element of fear in order to receive 
an outcome desired by management [26].   A positive fear appeal would promote a 
‘danger control process’ which can lead to a successful outcome as the message 
recipient undertakes a cognitive process to avert a threat.  Fear appeals are 
traditionally used within healthcare and marketing such as to promote anti-
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10 
smoking.  Johnston and Warkentin [26] also outlined a Fear Appeals Model (FAM) 
incorporating components such as perceived threat severity, perceived threat 
susceptibility, response efficacy, self-efficacy, social influence which then leads to 
behavioural intent.  Johnston and Warkentin [26] also states that the study aids the 
practice of information security management by exposing the inherent dangers of 
user autonomy and that end users are not consistent in their behaviours which is 
why a ‘one-size fits all’ approach to cyber security awareness and training does not 
offer adequate assurance.  A view that is backed up by the current incident 
statistics highlighted earlier in this article.  Also associated with the human conduct 
aspect of cyber security, was the undertaking of risky behaviour whereby people 
would undertake activity despite a known risk associated with the action.  Johnston 
and Warkentin [26] state that individuals exhibit a rather naïve belief that bad 
things only happen to other people and Aytes and Connolly [27] commented that 
the self-image of sophisticated, security-savvy users does not track very well with 
their training and actual behaviours.  In addition, there is a very interesting concept 
included by Aytes and Connolly [27] which stated: ‘The vast majority of the time, 
users can share passwords, open e-mail attachments without checking them for 
viruses, and so forth, with no negative consequences.  They are in fact rewarded in 
this behaviour, because they are either seen as helpful (in the case of sharing 
passwords) or they save time (by not scanning for viruses).    
In relation to the fear appeal mechanism highlighted within this article, it has been 
shown that fear appeals [26] in isolation do not provide effective or adequate 
assurance, as per its definition and organisations should not rely upon this 
mechanism.  The message could be misunderstood, forgotten or even ignored 
based on perceptions, relationships and social influence.  Therefore, this approach 
should be used as an alerting mechanism only and in order to introduce assurance 
requires feedback to the fear appeal sender to confirm compliance.  This could be a 
return confirmation message, scan, assessment, report, test or audit.  A good 
analogy here would be the use of TCP in computer networking to 
confirm/guarantee delivery as set out later in this article.  Defined assurance is 
essential for effective information security management as Aytes and Connolly 
[27] state: ‘The findings suggest that it is unlikely that computer users will 
significantly change their behaviour in response to simply being provided with 
additional information regarding computing risks and practices/ and ‘…likely that 
organisations will have to enforce compliance when the risks warrant it’. 
 
6. Measurement and Assessment 
 
Metrics within cyber security is very important as it enables current state to be 
quantified and subsequently enable understandable and repeatable results to be 
communicated.  It also allows organisations to understand, or set, what is or is not 
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11 
tolerable or acceptable.  An example of this is the use of the common vulnerability 
scoring system (CVSS) [28] which is used to establish the severity of known 
technical security vulnerabilities within computer systems and software.  This 
allows organisations, following a technical assessment, to identify the current 
vulnerabilities faced, confirm what is an acceptable level of exposure and address 
findings based on priority.  However, there is no equivalent to this with regard to 
human behaviour within mainstream cyber security practices despite security 
incidents and breaches pertaining to insiders equalling those relating to external 
threat actors. An example of a measurement technique used within some areas of 
industry is statistical quality control (SQC).   
Service organisations have lagged behind manufacturing firms in their use of SQC.  
The reason for this that SQC requires measurement and it is difficult to measure 
quality of a service [29] which is the primary reason why there is currently no 
consistent cyber security approach, quantification technique, nor associated 
accepted value with regard to human behaviour and its vulnerabilities.  This 
information is essential to enable organisations to make quality decisions.  For 
example, Rauscher and Cox [30] stated “My board has no way of knowing what 
we should be spending on cyber security.  I could ask for 10 times as much or half 
of my budget”.  Also, “…every successful quality revolution has included the 
participation of upper management.  We know of no exceptions”.  The PWC 
Information Security Breaches Survey [5] also found that 14% of respondents have 
never briefed their board on security risks, and in addition to this statistic 21% of 
organisations have not briefed their board in the last year showing a significant 
shortcoming in terms of business leaders being able to provide the assurance 
required as outlined earlier in this article.  It was also commented that some 
activities, whereby direct results cannot be measured, or feedback will be delayed, 
rendered it ineffective as management information. An example of this could be 
the handling of patient identifiable information or other protected or classified 
material [31].   
As already stated, currently within the cyber security community there are defined 
mechanisms for assessing threats, vulnerabilities and risks in relation to tangible 
aspects such as computer systems and physical environments.  With regard to 
human behaviour the cyber security community generally appears to be accepting 
of the fact that there is no mainstream mechanism for assessment and 
quantification.    However, within some industries this has been addressed through 
the use of human reliability assessment (HRA) and numerous underpinning 
techniques that have been developed.  HRA involves the use of qualitative and 
quantitative methods to assess the human contribution to risk and has been used 
within high reliability industries such as petro-chemical, nuclear and aviation [32].  
According to Gu et al. [33] human reliability is a term used to describe human 
performance such as the ability of a human to complete a given task without any 
errors in given conditions in a given time period. Gu et al. [33] also states that the 
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12 
human factors of people involved in information security can be categorised into 
cognition, physiology, psychology and ability and also demonstrates how 
incorporating HRA in to the risk assessment function significantly affects the risk 
assessment output.  This could subsequently affect the resultant activity taken by 
an organisation and again emphasises the importance of reliable assurance 
activities and information.  French et al. [34] support this view as they state that 
effective HRA not only complements sound technical risk analysis of the physical 
systems, but also helps organisations develop their safety culture and manage their 
overall risk.  Indeed, arguably it is through this that HRA achieves its greatest 
effect.  There are many varied methods available for HRA and one of these is 
called Human Error Assessment & Reduction Technique (HEART) which is a first 
generation HRA developed in 1985 with subsequent techniques further developed 
and adapted from HEART. 
HEART is well validated error analysis and quantification technique [32] utilised 
in order to provide proactive quantification of human behaviour.  It is intended to 
be a fast an easy method for identifying the risks associated with human error.   
Therefore, HEART should be a technique which is applicable to any situation or 
industry where human reliability is important, such as cyber security. 
HEART matches the identified task to one of eight generic task categories [35].  
These are: 
I. Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no idea of likely consequences 
II. Shift or restore system to a new or original state on a single attempt without 
supervision or procedures. 
III. Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and skill. 
IV. Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant attention. 
V. Routine, highly-practiced, rapid task involving relatively low level of skill. 
VI. Restore or shift a system to original or new state following procedures, with 
some checking. 
VII. Completely familiar, well designed, highly practiced routine task occurring 
several times per hour, performed to highest possible standards by highly 
motivated, highly trained and experienced person, totally aware of 
implications of failure, with time to correct potential error, but without the 
benefit of significant job aids. 
VIII. Respond correctly to system command even when there is an augmented or 
automated supervisory system providing accurate interpretation of system 
stage 
 The HEART process then requires the analysist or assessor to identify the 
applicable error producing conditions (EPC’s) from a list of options ranging from 
‘little or no independent checking or testing of output’ through to ‘operator 
inexperience’.  From this information calculations and formulae embedded within 
HEART are used to establish an overall human error probability (HEP) value to the 
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13 
identified task.  The HEART technique key elements within the quantification 
process are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. HEART quantification process 
 
HEART is an established first generation technique for predicting human 
reliability and identifying ways of reducing human error.  It should be possible 
based on the HEART process to relatively easily apply this technique to the cyber 
security filed for cyber security affecting tasks performed by people.  The HEART 
methodology takes in to account the task and the person performing the task rather 
than the technical process.  However, the scope and error focus of the assessment 
may be too narrow [34] through the application of a first generation technique.  
Second and third generation HRA techniques consider wider contexts in terms of 
the environment and human emotion.  The assessment must take into account the 
aggregated effect of people performing multiple tasks which may introduce greater 
likelihood of a cyber security breach or incident. 
 
7. The Proposed Framework 
 
Due to the large number of data breach cyber security incidents, it is evident that 
further research needs to be undertaken to establish why such a large number of 
security incidents are due to human behaviour.  The lack of formal cyber security 
assurance relating to human behaviour set out within this article is a significant 
area of concern.  There is use of the term assurance but in some cases this appears 
to be entirely focussed upon the underpinning security controls with greater 
emphasis on the technical elements.  This approach doesn’t provide real assurance 
through activities including assessment, quantification and reporting in order to 
provide confirmation that that these controls, including to address the risk of 
human error, have been applied correctly or as intended.   
As shown by the publicised cyber security incidents and breaches it is evident that 
the current common security standards leveraged by organisations to adequately 
cater for human error and the associated vulnerabilities, despite current prominent 
reports and surveys, require enhanced focus and attention relating to human 
behaviour and error aspect of cyber security.  For example, one of the 35 main 
security categories outlined within BS ISO/IEC 27002:2013 specifically addresses 
technical security weaknesses (12.6 Technical Vulnerability Management) but 
there is no equivalent within the standard pertaining to human factor 
vulnerabilities. Key cyber security areas should be defined and refined through a 
separate modular certification approach rather than rely upon standards such as BS 
Classify Generic Task Type 
Assign a nominal 
Human Error 
Probability (HEP) to 
the identified task 
Determine Error 
Producing 
Conditions (EPC)  
that may affect the 
identified task 
Determine the 
Assessed Proportion 
of Affect (APOA) for 
each EPC  
Calculate the HEP for 
the identified task 
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ISO/IEC 27002:2013.  These standards are too broad and overlap with other 
related standards as outlined in this article.  Effective modular assurance could be 
achieved through separate certification for cyber security practices based on the 
distinct differences in current incidents and breaches. 
Given the volumes of human factor related cyber security breaches and incidents, it 
is evident that the use of cyber security awareness training is important but 
organisations should consider how effective this approach is in isolation if the 
number of these breaches and incidents continue to increase and whether 
awareness alone is effective in the current climate or whether this should be 
enhanced through a cyber security human reliability assessment. Boards and senior 
management should consider whether they are taking sufficient steps to ensure a 
culture of strict and effective security pertaining to human error as internal, 
accidental factors remain the largest cause of cyber security breaches [5]. 
A technology scenario where return confirmation rather than a one-way 
communication, as a form of assurance, has been applied is the use of the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) within TCP/IP (Internet Protocol) computer 
networking.  TCP is one of the main protocols in TCP/IP networks. Whereas the IP 
protocol deals only with packets, TCP enables two hosts to establish a connection 
and exchange streams of data. TCP guarantees delivery of data and also guarantees 
that packets will be delivered in the same order in which they were sent.  Without 
the use of TCP there would just be an assumption that the connection had been 
successfully established and data delivered.  Another computer networking 
protocol which does not undertake message receipt confirmation is the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP); a connectionless protocol which provides a direct way 
to send and receive data and is used primarily for broadcasting messages over a 
computer network.  Therefore, a cyber security analogy using these protocols 
would be: 
 
 TCP - Security Manager of an organisation sends out an email alert to staff 
asking them to remove all client personal data from their desktop computer 
hard drives and store it on networked file servers where the data is secured 
and backed up on a regular basis.  However, the Security Manager also asks 
the message recipients to acknowledge receipt and understanding of the 
instruction and confirm when the task has been completed. 
 UDP – Security Manager of an organisation sends out a broadcast email 
alert to staff asking them to remove all client personal data from their 
desktop computer hard drives and store it on networked file servers where 
the data is secured and backed up on a regular basis. 
 
Obviously the UDP form of confirmation is much quicker and requires less 
management and interaction, however the Security Manager in the scenario above 
would not be able to provide assurance that the task had been completed or even 
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15 
the instruction received by the intended recipients.   Whereas, the TCP form would 
require confirmation to be sent to the Security Manager that would allow a greater 
degree of assurance that the instruction had been received by the intended 
recipient, understood, and that the staff members believe they have complied with 
the requirement.  In order to attain full assurance a form of independent testing 
would need to be undertaken with results checked and communicated.  Only then 
could the organisation really provide assurance that all personal data had been 
moved on to the central server as per the instruction. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. TCP Connection Process  
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Figure 3.2. Assurance process 
 
Organisations generally now understand that they should be measuring and 
monitoring their security controls through common channels now such as 
penetration testing, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment, audit, patching 
reports, incident statistics, and anti-virus software updates and coverage with 
internal audit and information/cyber risk assessment being the most common [5].  
These forms of assurance are definitely required and essential but when the 
management information they are providing is analysed they are ultimately 
retrospective and technology focussed.  Therefore, the human error with regard to 
cyber security has been found to be either too difficult, not able to provide 
financial reward, or felt to be not required despite the headlines we are often faced 
with.   Human reliability assessment methodologies and techniques have been 
developed and implemented within other industries but not cyber security to date.  
Methodologies such as HEART were developed approximately 20 years ago but 
still have not flowed in to mainstream information security practice in addition to 
the use of formal measurement techniques such as Statistical Quality Control 
(SQC) which are common in manufacturing environments [29].  The difficulties of 
quantifying human reliability within cyber security have not been developed and is 
not currently within mainstream information security practice.  The cyber security 
community should include a greater focus on quantification of all areas, including 
human reliability, to provide clear quality management information to Boards and 
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17 
senior management within organisations which in turn will allow greater cyber 
security assurance to be attained.  
With some technique modification, including adjusting evaluation focus to the 
human error potential pertaining to the use of, and concurrent access to, multiple 
data stores and applications which could result in cyber security incidents and 
breaches, the adaption of HEART or another HRA technique could benefit the 
cyber security community. 
In order to provide real assurance there must be a cyclic or return flow of 
information between the instigator and elements within scope of the activity, but in 
many cases this is not the case.  For example, in order to provide assurance an 
instruction must be communicated, a change implemented, a form of check 
undertaken, and the results of the check confirmed against the initial instruction as 
can be seen below in Figure 4.   
 
 
 
Figure 4. Basic Assurance Cycle 
 
This article has shown that a defined assurance model is required that interconnects 
with the models already developed such as the McCumber cube in order to 
enhance cyber security as shown in Figure 1.  Following the literature review an 
assurance framework is proposed that integrates human reliability assessment, 
statistical quality control and a vulnerability scoring system that pertains to human 
rather than technical vulnerabilities.  The framework should also be suitable for all 
cyber security affecting tasks performed by humans from routine processing of 
personal data through to technical application of security updates by administrative 
personnel.  Further research and development in this area should be undertaken, 
and as well as looking at the actual framework should also research methods of 
completion that could potentially ease the resourcing burden associated with the 
task.  Based on an organisational compliance program associated with human error 
Instruction 
Communicated 
Change 
Implemented 
Check 
Undertaken 
Results 
Confirmed 
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18 
related to the protection of electronic systems and data tests are proposed to 
establish the comparable accuracy of the assessment being performed by a security 
professional, non-security personnel and also employee self-assessment.  A 
conceptual high-level model of the proposed assurance framework is shown in 
Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Proposed high-level cyber security human vulnerability model 
 
There is an overhead associated with the proposed assurance framework in that 
organisations are required to invest in applying greater resources and time to 
meeting assurance requirements.  This will therefore require greater focus, 
attention and expenditure within cyber security assurance as this framework is not 
looking to introduce efficiencies but to enhance effectiveness which at this time 
comes with increased resource obligations.  These resource requirements could 
come from internal resources or be external independent resources as undertaken 
currently as part of technical security testing techniques.   
8. Conclusion 
As outlined within this article, organisations and society continue to be affected by 
both regular and similar cyber security breaches.  These breaches pertain to 
technical implementations as well as routine processing of confidential electronic 
information.  Despite this range of activities, it has been proven that half of these 
have human error at their core. Therefore, there should be increased empirical and 
theoretical research in to human aspects of cyber security based on the volumes of 
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19 
human error related incidents in order to establish ways in which mainstream cyber 
security practice can benefit.   
This article has demonstrated that there is further research required in to cyber 
security assurance and quantification in relation to human factors to develop an 
effective assurance framework.  This approach would benefit the field of cyber 
security as a common useable solution is not currently available and organisations 
are relying upon independent skills and knowledge of individuals.  It is proposed 
that a specific framework is developed based upon defined and repeatable 
quantification specifically relating to the range of human aspect tasks that provide, 
or are intended not to negatively affect cyber security posture.   Techniques that 
this framework should be built upon include human reliability assessment, 
statistical quality control and a cyber security human aspect vulnerability scoring 
system.  In conclusion, the cyber security community should continue to progress 
and develop but it must not forget its roots and the obvious statistics that indicate 
we have not yet addressed the risks associated with the one consistent element of 
cyber security, the human error.   
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